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1. The issue of nonacquiescence is raised most clearly by the conduct of the Social Security Ad-
ministration (SSA). SSA has been essentially unique in its vigorous defense of the right to nonac-
quiesce within a circuit. Other agencies that are certain which circuit will review their decisions
generally practice intracircuit acquiescence while pursuing their right to litigate an issue in other
circuits. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note j-f, at 743 n.308 (1989); see, e.g., Anselmo, Int., Dec.
3105, Bureau of Immigration Appeals, May 11, 1989, reprinted in INTERPRETER RELEASES (May
26, 1989) (rejecting policy of intracircuit nonacquiescence in deportation proceedings).
Based on their survey of fifty administrative agencies, Estreicher and Revesz categorize only four
agencies other than SSA as practicing intracircuit nonacquiescence: the Federal Labor Relations Au-
thority (FLRA), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Estreicher & Revesz, supra note ---, at 714,
717-18. The precise policy of the largest of these agencies, the IRS, is somewhat unclear. Compare
Letter from James K. Keightly, Associate Chief Counsel (Litigation), Department of the Treasury, to
Mary Candace Fowler, Administrative Conference of the United States (May 9, 1988) ("Even in
those limited circumstances where the Service states its disagreement with a decision of a court of
appeals, its well known policy is to give venue effect to those decisions both administratively and in
litigation until any conflict among the circuits is resolved.") (on file with authors) with Letter from
Daniel F. Folzenlogen, Special Appellate Counsel, Department of the Treasury, to Mary Candace
Fowler, Administrative Conference of the United States (July 26, 1988) ("[The] IRS rarely engages
in relitigation of issues within a committed circuit unless it is seeking clarification of the ruling of that
circuit; it is asking the committed circuit to reconsider its holding in light of the decisions of other
circuit courts of appeals; or it believes that Supreme Court review will or might result.") (on file with
authors). Of the other three agencies, only the MSPB operates in a system of venue certainty. See 5
U.S.C. § 7123(a) (1988) (venue for decisions of FLRA); 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1988) (venue for adjudi-
catory decisions of FTC). The MSPB has only recently adopted a policy of nonacquiescence. Es-
treicher & Revesz, supra note it, at 718.
2. See Hyatt v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987);
Beverly Enters. v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir. 1984); Douglas v. Schweiker, 734 F.2d 399,
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to comply with circuit precedent, the courts have drawn a sharp line be-
tween the authority of the government to pursue litigation in circuits that
have not yet ruled on an issue and its obligation to accept the settled law
of circuits that have ruled against the government.' The proposition that
the government should not litigate cases that are frivolous under circuit
law is so accepted by the courts and practitioners that, in 1984, two
United States Attorneys announced that they would not defend cases in
which a government agency had violated circuit precedent.4
In their recent article, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative
Agencies,' Professors Samuel Estreicher and Richard Revesz argue that
nonacquiescence within a circuit may be legitimate, even when the law of
the circuit is clearly settled.' They argue that nonacquiescence in a cir-
cuit's case law is permissible so long as the agency is reasonably seeking to
vindicate its position in the courts and is forwarding a position that is not
"so bereft of support in available legal materials that it is unlikely to be
accepted by any other court of appeals."' In their view, not only is the
agency under no obligation to follow settled circuit law in such circum-
stances, but it should also be insulated from injunctive relief that requires
prospective compliance with the law of the circuit.'
To support their standard, Estreicher and Revesz present an analysis of
400 (8th Cir. 1984); Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1983), adhered to, 725 F.2d 1489,
1496-97, 1500-01 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984); PPG Indus. v.
NLRB, 671 F.2d 817, 822-23 (4th Cir. 1982); Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224, 228 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 975 (1980); Mary Thompson Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 864 (7th
Cir. 1980); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 969-70 (3d Cir. 1979); Federal-Mogul
Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245, 1252 (5th Cir. 1978); Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315,
1331-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986). But see Yellow
Taxi Co. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 384-85 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wright, J. concurring). One court has
referred to an agency's failure to cite circuit law as a "symbolic bookburning difficult to ascribe to
oversight." NLRB v. Eastern Smelting & Ref. Corp., 598 F.2d 666, 670 n.7 (1st Cir. 1979).
3. See, e.g., Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. at 1359.
4. U.S. Official Curbs Disability Actions, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1984, at 54, col. 4; see Stieberger,
615 F. Supp. at 1354 (quoting statement of United States Attorney for Southern District of New
York).
5. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note #f, at 679.
6. Estreicher and Revesz would permit nonacquiescence in the face of repetitive rulings from a
circuit rejecting the agency's position. Their model only asks whether there is a chance of convincing
another circuit of the agency's position, and whether the agency is pursuing a reasonably vigorous
litigation strategy. Id. at 753.
7. Id. They would also require that the issue be one over which the agency has a responsibility
for uniform administration. Id.
8. Estreicher and Revesz also address intercircuit nonacquiescence and nonacquiescence in the
presence of venue uncertainty. Intercircuit nonacquiescence has not been very controversial and has
not led to criticism from the courts. See Judicial Review of Agency Action: HHS Policy of Nonacquies-
cence: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1985) (statement of Professor Lea
Brilmayer). As they discuss in their article, nonacquiescence in the face of venue uncertainty raises
different questions from intracircuit nonacquiescence. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note if, at
741-43; Note, Administrative Agency Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 582,
604-05 (1985). Most agencies other than SSA that have been criticized for engaging in nonacquies-
cence have the defense that more than one court has venue over their decisions. Estreicher & Revesz,
supra note #f, at 710-12.
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the costs and benefits of nonacquiescence. The principal benefit they asso-
ciate with nonacquiescence is the development of a uniform national stan-
dard through intercircuit dialogue. They suggest that intracircuit non-
acquiescence can foster intercircuit dialogue through the continual
reconsideration by circuit courts of their precedent. During this process,
Estreicher and Revesz would allow an agency to continue to apply its own
rules until the judicial system as a whole has rendered a uniform national
judgment. Although they recognize that nonacquiescence imposes costs,
they argue that an analysis of costs and benefits will always justify some
measure of intracircuit nonacquiescence.9 They further maintain that
Congress has authorized agencies to nonacquiesce through general statu-
tory provisions pertaining to uniform administration of statutes, and that
there is no constitutional bar to their proposed standard for intracircuit
nonacquiescence.10
This Comment critiques Estreicher and Revesz' underlying assump-
tions about our legal system and their proposed standard for permissible
nonacquiescence. We argue that their proposal upsets the balance between
agencies and courts by rendering the judiciary essentially powerless to en-
force congressional limitations on agency conduct for long periods of time.
Part I discusses Estreicher and Revesz' central premise that circuit court
precedent is so tentative and malleable that it is not entitled to authorita-
tive force. Part II disputes their assessment of the costs and benefits of
nonacquiescence, and shows that their analysis of the role of the circuit
courts leads them to overstate the benefits of nonacquiescence while un-
derestimating the resulting systemic inequalities. Part III builds on this
analysis to show that there is no basis for the core assumption of Es-
treicher and Revesz' legal analysis: that nonacquiescence is implicit in the
"congressional choice of administrative government.""1 Finally, Part IV
argues that under the existing structure of the judicial branch, their pro-
posed standard encourages agencies to engage in conduct that violates sep-
aration of powers as well as due process and equal protection principles.
I. THE ROLE OF CIRCUIT COURT PRECEDENT IN ACHIEVING
STABILITY AND CONSISTENCY IN THE APPLICATION OF FEDERAL
LAWS
An essential function of a judicial system is to maintain the rule of law.
Continuity between legal standards as expressed in judicial decisions and
legal standards as observed outside the courts is a central aspect of the
9. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note if, at 751-53. In particular, Estreicher and Revesz state that
the cost-benefit calculus always permits "interim" nonacquiescence as to decisions affecting public
benefit programs, irrespective of the consequences for the program's intended beneficiaries. They
would limit only the duration of the agency's nonacquiescence. Id. at 757.
10. Id. at 723-35.
11. Id. at 729.
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rule of law. This continuity protects the judiciary from being over-
whelmed by individual cases, provides for equality of treatment that is not
dependent on access to the courts, and enables parties to order their
affairs. Absent an ability to establish a rule of law, a judicial system be-
comes solely a resolver of individual disputes for those who pursue litiga-
tion, rather than an expositor of norms.
The central premise of Estreicher and Revesz' article is that our judi-
cial system should be treated as incapable of establishing a rule of law in
cases involving Federal agencies unless and until there is percolation of
issues throughout the courts of appeals and resolution by the Supreme
Court or Congress. Prior to such a nationwide resolution of an issue, they
treat the law as established by the circuit courts as merely tentative state-
ments by courts that lack authority to maintain a rule of law within their
jurisdictions. They therefore allow agencies to continue to apply rules as
though there were no judicial declaration of invalidity, so long as there is
a possibility that the agency will eventually convince another circuit of the
correctness of the agency's position. Indeed, Estreicher and Revesz go so
far as to state that the lower courts should not enforce their declarations
through injunctive relief even in a properly certified class action.
Estreicher and Revesz offer two justifications for their view of circuit
law. First, they assume that circuit courts may be expected to reconsider
their prior holdings whenever an agency position could be accepted by
another court.12 Thus, they presume that repetitive litigation will contrib-
ute to national law development by leading the circuits to revise their
precedents until they are in harmony. Second, Estreicher and Revesz see
the possibility that a later Supreme Court decision will change the gov-
erning Federal law as depriving circuit court decisions of authoritative
force, no matter how many times the circuit has revisited an issue and
adhered to its precedent.13
Estreicher and Revesz' view of circuit court precedent is inconsistent
with the central role assigned to these courts in the Federal judicial sys-
tem. Although they correctly note that one function of circuit courts is to
participate in the process of national law development, they would have
this role triumph over the circuit courts' essential function of providing a
measure of judicial repose within each regional circuit. Neither of their
arguments for viewing circuit courts as lacking power to preserve the rule
of law squares with the standards that our judicial system has adopted to
12. Estreicher and Revesz advance no argument for why courts of appeals should routinely reas-
sess their decisions in the absence of contrary rulings in other circuits. See id. at 727 (court of appeals
expected to be open to reconsidering prior rulings in light of developments in other circuits); id. at 746
(possibility of reconsideration extends to cases where first panel did not fully consider issues). How-
ever, they would permit nonacquiescence even where no other court of appeals has addressed the issue
or where no split in the circuits has developed. Thus, they treat the possibility of a split in the circuits
as having the same consequence as an actual split.
13. Id. at 724-28.
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determine the binding effect of judicial decisions. These standards are both
an integral part of our judicial branch as currently structured and are
necessary to the preservation of the rule of law. They have full force in
Federal agency cases, where the treatment of circuit law as merely a ten-
tative statement of what the law might be would overwhelm the judiciary.
The judicial branch is structured to ensure uniformity and stability of
legal standards within each regional circuit while permitting disuniformity
among the circuits. The circuit system serves to allocate the judicial power
among manageable units that can preserve the rule of law within their
jurisdictions through adherence to stare decisis.14 Intercircuit stare decisis,
however, is not necessary to the maintenance of the rule of law. As long as
parties can discern which circuit law applies to any given conduct, the
parties can shape their action to conform to legal standards. Furthermore,
permitting circuits to independently examine issues contributes to resolu-
tion of important legal questions on a national basis. Accordingly, each
circuit remains completely free to accept or reject the reasoning of other
courts of appeals. 5 This mixture of uniformity and diversity strikes a bal-
ance that permits legal issues to receive independent examination by a
number of courts, 6 while at the same time maintaining a unitary rule of
law in any given geographic location.
The rules governing circuit reconsideration of precedent are set forth
both in the local rules of courts"' and in Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Together, these rules require panels to follow prior
panels within their circuits and limit reconsideration of precedent to the
en banc process, which may be resorted to only in specified circum-
stances.18 Local rules requiring panels to abide by the decisions of other
14. See infra pp. 807-09.
15. See J. MOORE, 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.402(1) (1988). Similarly, district courts
are not bound to follow decisions of other district courts or of courts of appeals for other circuits. Id.
16. See Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a
Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 913, 929-31 (1983).
17. For decisions setting forth the rules of the circuits, see, e.g., Humane Soc'y of United States v.
EPA., 790 F.2d 106, 110 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Jusino v. Zayas, 875 F.2d 986, 993 (1st Cir. 1989);
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 623 F.2d 786, 788 (2d Cir. 1980), affd, 456 U.S. 461 (1982);
United States v. Inmon, 594 F.2d 352, 354 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979); Willey v.
Coiner, 464 F.2d 525, 526 (4th Cir. 1972); Umphlet v. Connick, 815 F.2d 1061, 1063 (5th Cir.
1987); Salmi v. Secretary of HHS, 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985); Woodard v. Sargent, 806 F.2d
153, 156 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Washington, 872 F.2d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 1989); Plastic
Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Okla., 708 F.2d 1554, 1559 (10th Cir. 1983); Sherry Mfg.
Co. v. Towel King of Fla., Inc., 822 F.2d 1031, 1034 n.3 (11th Cir. 1987); Mother's Restaurant, Inc.
v. Mama's Pizza, Inc., 723 F.2d 1566, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Seventh Circuit has an internal
rule requiring that decisions overturning precedent be circulated to the full court. See United States v.
Frederick, 835 F.2d 1211, 1214 n.10 (7th Cir. 1987).
18. In their Reply, Estreicher and Revesz place great weight on the practice, adopted in the
Seventh Circuit and occasionally used by other courts, of departing from past precedent through a
quasi-en banc process of circulating decisions to all active judges on the court prior to publication.
Estreicher & Revesz, The Uneasy Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence: A Reply, 99 YALE L.J.
831, 837-38 (1990). Our argument is not, however, that the en banc process is too cumbersome to
permit routine reassessment of precedent, but instead that the rules are structured to make departures
from prior decisions unusual events requiring the attention of the full court. The use of quasi-en banc
19901
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 99: 801
panels were put into place to prevent inconsistencies within circuits that
were forcing the circuits into large numbers of en banc hearings.1" They
reflect traditional principles of stare decisis that hold that judicial deci-
sions create rules binding on the same court and lower courts in similar
cases that may arise.20 Pursuant to these rules, panels abide by the law of
the circuit even where other circuits have adopted contrary views. 21
Rule 35 complements these local rules by providing for hearings en
banc in situations where an inconsistency in the law of the circuit develops
or where there is a particularly important issue to be reviewed. Notably,
disagreement by another circuit is not a basis for reconsideration of prece-
dent under Rule 35 unless the issue is of "exceptional importance.
'22
Even when an issue is of such importance, nothing in Rule 35 mandates
that the circuit return to consider the issue. Altogether, the evidence shows
that very few cases receive en banc consideration. Over the last decade,
99.5 percent of all court of appeals decisions have been rendered without
the en banc process.
23
These rules do not absolutely foreclose a circuit from overturning its
procedures does not detract from this proposition.
19. See Solimine, Ideology and En Bane Review, 67 N.C.L. REv. 29, 36 (1988).
20. See Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 969-70 (3d Cir. 1979). There are of
course many proposals for changing these rules. For example, Judge Posner argues that a panel
should be free to abandon circuit precedent when another circuit has adopted a contrary rule. See R.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 255-56 (1985). The consequences and per-
missibility of nonacquiescence in our judicial system, however, must be evaluated in terms of the rules
that have been established by Congress and the courts. It is these rules of the judicial branch that
determine whether nonacquiescence creates impermissible dual standards of law.
21. See, e.g., Salmi v. Secretary of HHS, 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985) (court bound by its
prior decision despite contrary subsequent holdings of two circuits).
22. FED. R. App. P. 35. Maintaining consistency in the law of the circuit is the primary purpose
of the en banc rule. As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp.,
363 U.S. 685, 689-90 (1960):
The principal utility of determinations by the courts of appeals en banc is to enable the court
to maintain its integrity as an institution by making it possible for a majority of its judges
always to control and thereby to secure uniformity and continuity in its decisions, while ena-
bling the court at the same time to follow the efficient and time-saving procedure of having
panels of three judges hear and decide the vast majority of cases as to which no division exists
within the court.
(quoting Mars, Hearing and Rehearing Cases In Banc, 14 F.R.D. 91, 96 (1954)). See Western Pac.
R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 270 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (domi-
nant concern of en banc rules is to resolve conflicts within circuit).
In contrast, resolution of inconsistencies across circuits is not a central purpose of the en bane
procedure and is not specified as a separate ground for en bane consideration. Instead, the underlying
issues must meet the general criteria of Rule 35, which requires that issues be of "exceptional impor-
tance." For cases refusing to grant en banc consideration despite contrary rulings of other circuits, see,
e.g., Uviedo v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 760 F.2d 87, 88 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054
(1986) (denying rehearing en banc despite contrary rules in 11 circuits); Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d
592, 611, 612 n.1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 947 (1987) (denying rehearing en banc despite
contrary rule in several other circuits).
23. Solimine, supra note 19, at 46. In reply, Estreicher and Revesz claim that this statistic is not
significant, and that the only evidence that is pertinent is "the percentage of cases in which there is a
conflict in the circuits over an issue of 'exceptional importance' that are not reviewed en banc." Es-
treicher & Revesz, Reply, supra note 18, at 837. However, because they would permit an agency to
nonacquiesce even when there is no conflict in the circuits and the issue is not one of "exceptional
importance," the low probability that any given decision will be considered en bane is significant.
Intracircuit Nonacquiescence
past precedent, but they represent a powerful presumption in favor of the
continued authoritative force of the circuit's decisions. It is therefore con-
sistent with these rules for a circuit to return to a decision that has been
seriously called into question by numerous subsequent decisions or where
an issue is otherwise of extraordinary importance.24 But these rules
plainly do not presume that the mere disagreement by another circuit-let
alone the possibility of a disagreement-overcomes the presumptive force
of a circuit's holdings.2"
The division of circuits into panels makes these rules enhancing circuit
stability particularly necessary to preservation of the rule of law. By re--
quiring adherence to prior panel decisions, the circuits are able to main-
tain a degree of consistency within each circuit that would be impossible if
each panel were entitled to reject the conclusion of a prior panel.26 A
system in which panels were free to overturn prior panels would allow the
law within each circuit to be in constant flux, and would deprive the cir-
cuits of their ability to provide clear direction to parties and the lower
courts. Rules of stare decisis promote equality of treatment at the lower
court level (as well as for those who never seek judicial review) by giving
clear guidance as to the rule of law.
The value of maintaining stability in circuit court precedent flows di-
rectly from the nature of a hierarchical legal system. To control the vol-
ume of cases requiring adjudication, the circuit courts are designed to hear
a limited number of cases, with more routine matters decided by the dis-
trict courts and administrative agencies, and with parties conforming their
24. See Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. at 1359 & n.31; see, e.g., Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d
982, 1000 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc) (reversing United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970)).
In their Reply, Estreicher and Revesz point to additional circumstances where circuits have reversed
themselves. Estreicher & Revesz, Reply, supra note 18, at 838. We agree that it is appropriate for
circuits to revisit obsolete, outmoded cases, see, e.g., United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268 (8th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979). We also agree that a decision may be reviewed when there
has been a pertinent change in the law. See, e.g., Campos v. Lefevre, 825 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1304 (1988). Other scattered instances in which circuits have reversed them-
selves do not establish that the principles of stare decisis that order our judicial system have been
discarded and that all case law may be regarded as suspect at the time it is issued. In light of the
radical view Estreicher and Revesz take of the role of stare decisis in our legal system, we believe that
it is they who bear the burden of proving empirically that these rules have no meaning in practice.
25. Thus, it is plainly insufficient under rules of stare decisis and Rule 35 to treat a circuit
opinion as lacking authoritative force because another circuit previously ruled the other way. Under
Estreicher and Revesz' model, if circuit one rules for the agency and circuit two rules against the
agency, the agency is permitted to nonacquiesce within the jurisdiction of circuit two. The fact that
circuit one ruled for the agency is proof of the "justifiability" of the agency's position under their test.
The agency would be able to nonacquiesce under their standard if it unsuccessfully sought certiorari.
Indeed, they might not require the agency to seek certiorari since the conflict would, at that time, be
limited to two circuits. See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE
58 (1986) (offering three-circuit test for granting certiorari to resolve conflict).
26. See Lacy v. Gardino, 791 F.2d 980, 985 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 888 (1986) ("Uni-
formity of decisions within a multipanel circuit can only be achieved by strict adherence to prior
circuit precedent, with the error-correcting function reserved to the court sitting en banc."). See gener-
ally Kornhauser & Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 111 (1986). Although it is more
difficult for panels to achieve coherence in their decisions, id., the problem is hardly solved by elimi-
nating the consistency that is achieved by having panels follow the rules set forth by prior panels.
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conduct to the rule of law. If the decisions of the circuits were not
accorded precedential weight, but were constantly open to question, these
courts could be easily overwhelmed by parties raising issues addressed in
earlier rulings by the same court. The system simply could not function if
precedent were so unstable."7
Because of the size of the Federal agency docket subject to review, the
stability and consistency created by these rules for achieving judicial re-
pose within each circuit are essential to orderly judicial review of agency
action." Federal agencies process many times the number of cases that are
reviewed in Federal court. 9 When agencies apply rules differently from
the courts, agency adjudication becomes simply a hurdle to overcome
before obtaining judicial review. The potential for overwhelming the
courts with challenges to agency determinations is staggering. 0 This bur-
27. For this reason, the two newest courts of appeals have adopted the precedent of their prede-
cessor courts and limited reconsideration of precedent to the en banc process. See South Corp. v.
United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) ("To proceed without precedent, deciding each
legal principle anew, would for too long deprive the bar and the public of the stability and predict-
ability essential to the effort of a free society to live under a rule of law."); Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 1981) ("Theoretically this court could decide to proceed with its
duties without any precedent, deciding each legal principle anew.... This court, the trial courts, the
bar and the public are entitled to a better result than to be cast adrift among the differing precedents
of other jurisdictions, required to examine afresh every legal principle.").
In their Reply to this Comment, Estreicher and Revesz suggest that we view the circuits as inde-
pendent "fiefdoms" that do not listen to each other. Estreicher & Revesz, Reply, supra note 18, at
832. We do not argue, however, that the courts of appeals should ignore each other, nor do we deny
that circuit courts are part of a single federal system. In fact, to the extent that a circuit court decision
is accorded deference in other circuits, the possibility of a later split in the circuits diminishes and the
asserted benefits of nonacquiescence become more tenuous. See id. at 834, n.18.
28. Although the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984),
protects the government from non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel, it does not authorize any gen-
eral exemption from the rules of precedent for the United States. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note
"f, at 684-86; Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson and Administrative Adjudication, 77
GEO. L.J. 1815, 1875-81 (1989). Indeed, Justice White's concurrence in United States v. Stauffer
Chemical Co., 464 U.S. 165 (1984), recognizes the powerful role of the law of the circuit in determin-
ing the law that should be applied. Id. at 177 (White, J., concurring) (law of circuit overcomes
doctrine of mutual collateral estoppel). Application of rules of stare decisis to a Federal agency is
particularly reasonable because the agency was party to the case determining the precedent, and had
an opportunity to bring relevant arguments to the panel's attention, to petition for rehearing, and to
suggest en bane review.
29. Manageability of the Federal caseload for review of agency action depends on a system that
avoids reversible error on the part of agency adjudicators. The Federal government processes massive
numbers of cases at the administrative agency level. See Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year:
Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987) (number of filings potentially requiring administrative hearings in
1983 was 30% greater than total number of actions filed in district court). The judicial system would
be overwhelmed if all of these cases were adjudicated in conflict with circuit standards. Currently,
only a fraction of these cases reach the Federal courts. Id. at 1099 n.28 (citing literature on Federal
court workload).
30. For example, in fiscal year 1987 administrative law judges adjudicated over 230,000 claims
for Social Security and Supplemental Security Income benefits. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMM.
ON WAYS AND MEANS, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1988). The burden of reviewing the vast numbers
of decisions by Federal agencies is currently mitigated by judicial exercise of injunctive powers, and by
the widespread adherence of many agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service and the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, to circuit court precedent. See supra note 1.
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den would be even greater if the courts were expected constantly to recon-
sider their precedents either by abandoning prior panel rulings or through
the en banc process.
It may be true that circuits do not always achieve the stability of in-
tracircuit law that our legal system envisions,"1 but the rules are clearly
written to achieve such uniformity. Where the circuits fall short of this
goal, the resulting disuniformity is recognized as a crisis requiring reform.
For example, at the time Congress decided to divide the Fifth Circuit, that
circuit was having substantial difficulty retaining consistency in its deci-
sions and, as a result, was burdened by the administrative cost and delay
of numerous en banc petitions. As the House report stated, the circuit was
divided to provide a judicial structure "capable of meeting the clear man-
dates of our judicial system-the rendering of consistent, expeditious, fair
and inexpensive justice."32
Apart from these structural reasons why circuit court decisions serve as
definitive statements of law within their jurisdictions, there are many
practical reasons why Estreicher and Revesz' vision of the role of circuit
law is unrealistic. They essentially view case law as setting forth distinct
issues that are developed in a large number of circuits and ultimately re-
solved by a conflict resolver, such as the Supreme Court. Although this
view of the law may make sense from the perspective of issues the
Supreme Court has actually decided, it mischaracterizes the nature of the
judicial landscape on statutory issues. Many statutory issues are too short-
lived to be passed on by all circuits and to warrant Supreme Court re-
view.3" Other issues may arise too infrequently to be passed on by a large
number of circuits. 4 Some issues are not significant enough to lead to
31. See Strauss, supra note 29, at 1106 n.53 (assumption that en banc process ensures intracircuit
uniformity may be "heroic").
32. H.R. REP. No. 1390, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 4236, 4237.
33. Many statutory provisions expire by their own terms after a specified period of time. The
Supreme Court is likely to view these issues as lacking sufficient significance to warrant high court
review. For example, the statutory standard for evaluations of pain in the Social Security disability
program, enacted in 1984, had a sunset date of January 1, 1987. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (1982
& Supp. V 1987). The interpretation of this provision is therefore an unlikely candidate for Supreme
Court review. The proper interpretation of the provision is nonetheless extremely important to disa-
bility cases and has been a subject of much litigation. See, e.g., Duncan v. Secretary of HHS, 801
F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1986); Green v. Schweiker, 749 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1984); Polaski v. Heckler, 751
F.2d 943, 950 (8th Cir. 1984), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Bowen v. Polaski, 476 U.S.
1167, adhered to, 804 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 927 (1987).
34. There are many statutory issues that arise rarely in circuit case law, even though this case law
sets standards that affect other cases. For example, the issue in Smith v. Heckler, 820 F.2d 1093 (9th
Cir. 1987), was whether an illegitimate, posthumously born child could receive Social Security survi-
vors' benefits if the deceased wage earner provided support to the surviving parent but had no inten-
tion of supporting the unborn child. Although SSA undoubtedly processes applications of similarly
situated persons, such eligibility issues are not often litigated.
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higher review.3 5 With respect to many issues, the circuits will ultimately
agree with each other.38
Of course, when a significant conflict develops, the Supreme Court will
sometimes intervene. Estreicher and Revesz, however, significantly over-
state the role of Supreme Court review in resolving statutory issues. They
view the potential for intercircuit conflict followed by Supreme Court res-
olution to be so great as to render decisions by the courts of appeals mere
points along the path to the high court."7 While the Supreme Court re-
mains, along with Congress, the arbiter of last resort on statutory issues,
its decisional capacity is small compared to the large number of statutory
matters addressed by the courts of appeals. 8
Even if the Supreme Court eventually resolves an issue decided by the
court of appeals, there are numerous reasons to treat the declarations of
the courts of appeals as authoritative, pending a determination by the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court frequently addresses narrowly
35. See R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 4.4 (6th ed.
1986) (issues not of sufficient general importance may be denied review despite conflict among cir-
cuits). For example, there is an outstanding conflict between the Federal Circuit and the District of
Columbia, Third, and Fifth Circuits over the standard for review of denials of certain pay increases to
Federal workers. Compare Romane v. Defense Contract Audit Agency, 760 F.2d 1286 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (substantial evidence standard) with White v. Department of the Army, 720 F.2d 209 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (preponderance of the evidence standard) and Stankis v. EPA, 713 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir.
1983) (same) and Schramm v. HHS, 682 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1982) (same).
36. For example, the courts ultimately reached agreement on the question of the appropriate
standard for terminating disability benefits. See infra pp. 826-28. As Estreicher and Revesz recognize
in their Reply, principles of deference to coordinate courts serve to reduce conflicts among the circuits.
See Estreicher & Revesz, Reply, supra note 18, at 834 n.18.
37. In their article, Estreicher and Revesz acknowledge that in practice Supreme Court review is
frequently unavailable. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note ---, at 744. Nonetheless, their analysis de-
pends upon sufficient availability of Supreme Court review to render decisions by courts of appeals
inherently unstable unless there is a clear consensus among circuits.
38. See Strauss, supra note 29, at 1099-1100 & n.28. Many commentators have observed that
these limitations on the workload of the Supreme Court prevent the Court from acting in a timely
manner to resolve all conflicts. See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 162 (1985); Baker &
McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1406-07 (1987).
Relying on a recent study of certiorari decisions in the 1982 term, Estreicher and Revesz state that
the Court has the capacity to intervene in all important conflicts. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note t.,
at 752 n.331. The Supreme Court study, however, is directed to a different question from that raised
by intracircuit nonacquiescence. The study asks whether there is an intolerable level of conflict over
"important" questions. It does not ask whether the courts conflict over the proper interpretation of all
issues of statutory and regulatory law. Circuit court decisions that create conflicts that are "tolerable"
from the standpoint of the Supreme Court are the least likely to be affected by subsequent Supreme
Court action. See generally Sturley, Observations on the Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction in
Intercircuit Conflict Cases, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1251, 1257-60 (1989) (intercircuit conflicts are tolerable
for multijurisdictional actors if they can predict what law will apply to any given transaction); Posner,
supra, at 163 (Federal government can adjust conduct across jurisdictions). The Supreme Court study
is also limited to issues brought to the Court's attention. In their Reply, Estreicher and Revesz suggest
that nothing short of incompetence among practitioners could explain the existence of conflicts not
included in the study. Estreicher & Revesz, Reply, at 836 n.29. There are many reasons, however,
why practitioners may not seek certiorari. In addition to the factors that may indicate a low likelihood
that the Court will grant certiorari, see supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text, a simple weighing
of costs of further litigation and the potential benefits of Supreme Court review may lead a party to
abandon a claim after the court of appeals level. Baker & McFarland, supra, at 1406-07; cf G.
CASPER & R. POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 31, 61 (1976) (low probability of
review decreases incentives to file for certiorari).
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framed questions that leave many matters unresolved. 9 By issuing nar-
rowly tailored rulings, the Supreme Court can alter the debate on statu-
tory issues rather than finally resolving the matters in dispute. Further-
more, the Supreme Court may sustain the courts of appeals that ruled
against an agency. Lastly, the interval between a court of appeals decision
and a subsequent Supreme Court decision on the same issue is often mea-
sured in years.40 During this period, the court of appeals decision remains
the last word within the circuit in which it was rendered.
Altogether, because of the likelihood that the Federal courts will agree
as to matters of statutory interpretation, the rules curtailing revision of
precedent, and limitations on Supreme Court review, our legal system
treats the law of the circuit as authoritative until it is overturned. By mod-
eling their analysis on three contingencies-that the courts of appeals
might come into conflict whenever the agency's position is not "bereft of
support," that any such conflict could lead to reconsideration by the first
court or to Supreme Court review, and that such reconsideration or re-
view will overturn a circuit court decision adverse to the
agency-Estreicher and Revesz treat the exceptional situation as the norm
and vastly understate the degree to which our judicial system depends on
the circuit courts to provide order and stability in the administration of
the law.
39. The Supreme Court's decision in Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104 (1984), illustrates how Su-
preme Court decisions may leave many issues unresolved. In Day the Court held that courts may not
impose class-wide nonstatutory deadlines on the adjudication of claims for disability benefits to rem-
edy unreasonable delays by SSA. The decision, however, left open all other questions concerning
individual and class relief for unreasonable delays, 467 U.S. at 119 n.33, and the circuits have divided
over the availability of other forms of class-wide relief. Compare Barnett v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 17 (2d
Cir. 1986) (holding class-wide notice relief to be appropriate) with Crosby v. SSA, 796 F.2d 576 (Ist
Cir. 1986) (rejecting Barnett).
Another example is the Supreme Court's narrow decision in Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458
(1983), upholding regulations for determining whether a person who claims disability can adjust to
other work in the national economy. Although the Court upheld the validity of the regulations, it
reserved many issues regarding their application. For example, it did not rule on the validity of the
guidelines for determining whether a person's age renders him or her unable to make a vocational
adjustment to other work. Id. at 464 n.8. This issue had itself divided the circuits, compare Broz v.
Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1359, 1360 (1lth Cir. 1982), vacated, 461 U.S. 952 (1983) with Cummins
v. Schweiker, 670 F.2d 81, 83 (7th Cir. 1982); and remains unresolved, compare Reeves v. Heckler,
734 F.2d 519 (11th Cir. 1984) (Secretary cannot apply vocational guidelines where claimant has
presented substantial credible evidence that claimant's ability to adapt to new work environment is
less than level presumed by guidelines) with Underwood v. Bowen, 828 F.2d 1081, 1083 n.1 (5th Cir.
1987) (declining to rule on issue decided by Eleventh Circuit in Reeves). Complete resolution of these
issues could last many years past the useful life of the regulations themselves. Because the regulations
reflect fact findings about jobs in the economy made in 1980, they will probably become obsolete
before all issues about their proper application are resolved.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Bartlett, 794 F.2d 1285, 1293 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 934 (1986) (noting five year gap between circuit's decision in United States v. Dupris, 612 F.2d
319 (8th Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 446 U.S. 980 (1980), and Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S.
463 (1984)); see also COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUC-
TURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 13 (1975) (resolution of con-
flicts may come after years of uncertainty and confusion).
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II. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF NONACQUIESCENCE
In light of structural limitations on circuit reconsideration of past prece-
dent, Estreicher and Revesz have greatly overstated the systemic benefits
of nonacquiescence while underestimating the devastating costs nonacqui-
escence may have in practice. Each of the benefits they associate with non-
acquiescence is premised on a strong likelihood that circuits will depart
from the rules of stare decisis. In fact, only three cost-benefit factors play
a significant role: the hardship for those who are denied the benefit of the
circuit rule at the administrative level and are unable to seek the judicial
review necessary to gain the benefit of the court rule; the financial cost
and hardship due to delay imposed on those who manage to appeal to
court; and the burden of repetitive litigation, borne by the judiciary. Be-
cause the hardship to parties affected by nonacquiescence can only be mit-
igated through massive repetitive litigation, the overall costs of nonacqui-
escence can be shifted but will always remain significant.
The three benefits Estreicher and Revesz attribute to nonacquiescence
are intercircuit dialogue, uniformity of treatment, and uniformity of ad-
ministration.4' These suggested benefits disappear when one recognizes
that stare deciiis plays a central role in maintaining the stability of law
within the circuits.
As Estreicher and Revesz recognize, agency compliance with circuit law
within a circuit does not inhibit the primary form of intercircuit dialogue
where circuits consider issues that have been ruled on by other circuits.
But they propose that proper "percolation" of issues in the courts of
appeals requires that circuit courts reconsider issues that they previously
resolved.42 The marginal benefits to intercircuit dialogue that Estreicher
and Revesz attribute to nonacquiescence depend on such circuit reconsid-
eration being common, if not the norm.43 Given the circuit court rules
designed to achieve stability of precedent, however, it will be the rare case
in which nonacquiescence leads to any additional intercircuit dialogue.44
The stability of circuit law also provides strong reason to doubt that
41. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note i-f, at 743-49.
42. It is far from obvious that intracircuit nonacquiescence is necessary for a circuit to reconsider
an issue. In addition to the possibility of pursuing a declaratory judgment, an agency can often seek to
relitigate an issue in the context of a case where there are issues about the proper application of
precedent. See Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1360 & n.32 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated on
other grounds, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
43. Much of the discussion of dialogue in Estreicher and Revesz' Reply is devoted to the general
value of intercircuit dialogue. Estreicher & Revesz, Reply, supra note 18, at 833-35. The only issue
relevant to intracircuit nonacquiescence, however, is the marginal benefit provided by repetitive litiga-
tion in a circuit that has already ruled on a question. Notably, they would allow intracircuit nonac-
quiescence in order to protect the agency's ability to relitigate even where there has been no subse-
quent decision by another circuit that creates a conflict.
44. Because courts are so hesitant to abandon their precedents, the danger of a "ratchet effect"
operating against an agency is greatly exaggerated. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note "#f, at 739;
Estreicher & Revesz, Reply, supra note 18, at 835. Unfair ratcheting is especially unlikely in light of
the high degree of deference courts pay to agencies.
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nonacquiescence enhances uniform application of Federal law. Estreicher
and Revesz suggest that requiring administrative adherence to decisions of
the courts of appeals within their jurisdictions promotes disuniformity
among regions of the country and, in some situations, may even lead to
decisions in one jurisdiction having effects in other jurisdictions. Thus,
they suggest, an air pollution standard applied in one state will affect a
downwind state's air and will affect the relative competitiveness of indus-
try in two states.45 At a more general level, they suggest that treating
people differently depending on where they live is inherently unfair.
The difficulty with this analysis is that it presumes that nonacquies-
cence somehow enhances national uniformity. Problems caused by differ-
ing regional rules are irrelevant to an analysis of nonacquiescence unless
nonacquiescence contributes to uniformity across regions. Only in excep-
tional circumstances where the circuit will depart from its past precedent
is there any possibility that intracircuit nonacquiescence will advance in-
tercircuit uniformity. Nonacquiescence by itself does not lead to uniform
application of the law, because in regions where the judicial precedent sets
forth standards or procedures that differ from the policy applied by an
agency, parties that lose before the agency need only seek judicial review
to obtain the benefit of circuit court precedent. Absent barriers to judicial
review (such as lack of legal counsel, lack of knowledge that the standards
applied by the judiciary differ from those of the agency, or a judgment
that the amount at issue does not justify the cost of litigation), all disap-
pointed parties affected by nonacquiescence can be expected to vindicate
their rights in court. So long as the circuit court's rule continues to be
available to those who live in its region, nonacquiescence only serves to
cause gross disuniformity between those who can pursue their appeals and
those who cannot.
46
The third benefit Estreicher and Revesz attribute to nonacquiescence is
that it saves the agency the costs of differential administration associated
with applying different sets of rules in different parts of the country. Here
Estreicher and Revesz focus solely on the costs of following circuit law,
45. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note f., at 747.
46. When uniform national rules are especially important, Congress can create special courts or
venue rules to assure uniformity. For example, when Congress became concerned about disuniformity
in the interpretation of patent law and the forum shopping which resulted, it removed appeals in such
cases from the jurisdiction of the regional courts of appeals and transferred jurisdiction to the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (96 Stat.) 25, 38. See S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 11, 15. In the case of ambient air standards,
the example provided by Estreicher and Revesz, Congress assured uniformity by creating exclusive
venue in the District of Columbia Circuit. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1982). Disuniformity is generally
viewed as only problematic in situations where there is a high possibility of forum shopping or a
multi-circuit actor cannot determine how to plan its behavior to comply with the law. See S. Es-
TREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 25, at 57-58; Sturley, supra note 38, at 1259-60. Where dis-
uniformity is problematic, nonacquiescence is no solution because it creates its own disuniformities.
See infra pp. 814-15.
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while ignoring administrative savings from adherence to the law that, in
all likelihood, would be applied by the reviewing court. Courts are likely
to find error in agency decisions that are not made in accordance with
circuit law. Because of the deference granted to agencies as fact finders,
the outcome on appeal will often be a remand to the agency for applica-
tion of judicial standards to the case. This is especially likely when the
court concludes that there has been an error of law, or that some required
procedural rule has not been followed.4 As a result, any accurate measure
of the administrative costs of nonacquiescence must account for both the
costs of differential administration and the costs of conducting additional
administrative proceedings to apply the law of the circuit. In many cases,
nonacquiescence causes two rounds of administrative proceedings where
only one would have been necessary if circuit rules had been applied by
the agency in the first instance. If all parties affected by nonacquiescence
managed to obtain judicial review, there can be little question that the
administrative costs of readjudicating every case where the circuit abides
by its prior decisions would exceed those of compliance with case law. 8
While Estreicher and Revesz inflate the benefits of nonacquiescence,
they vastly understate its costs. They identify two costs: distributional con-
sequences for those who do not appeal and increased judicial workload.
Each of these repercussions is far more severe than they suggest.49
Estreicher and Revesz recognize that nonacquiescence frequently im-
poses costs on parties who lack the resources or the sophistication to com-
mence litigation to obtain the benefit of judicial precedent. These parties
are unable to obtain the benefit of circuit court rules and may suffer seri-
ous harms, such as the termination of subsistence benefits or deportation,
which would be avoided by application of circuit court precedent. Indeed,
even for those who have the resources to obtain judicial review, Estreicher
and Revesz recognize that the costs of litigation may result in affected
parties deciding not to pursue their right to application of circuit prece-
47. See, e.g., Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1106 (5th Cir. 1985) (announcing that court will
remand all future cases where agency has applied incorrect legal standard for evaluating disability).
48. There is also good reason to doubt agency protestations about the costs of conveying circuit
rules to agency decisionmakers within a particular jurisdiction. Estreicher and Revesz quote counsel
for the IRS, the NLRB, and HHS as support for the proposition that there are "high costs" to
differential administration. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note "-f, at 690-91 & nn.40-41, 749 n.323.
Some of these costs are simply a product of the fact that the agencies have not organized themselves to
facilitate acquiescence. For example, if Congress created venue certainty for the NLRB, as Estreicher
and Revesz propose, the NLRB's regional offices could be reorganized along circuit lines. Estreicher
& Revesz, supra note -f, at 741-43. Similarly, the problem of updating instructions is one that
agencies already face and have established mechanisms to accommodate. SSA, for example, uses vari-
ous forms of transmittals and program circulars to apprise adjudicators of developments that they
want them to follow. Such circulars are often tailored to questions that arise in a particular region. In
fact, SSA circulates court decisions that it agrees with as binding Social Security Rulings. The ques-
tion is not one of mechanisms to convey court decisions, but rather an agency's willingness to do so.
49. Estreicher and Revesz also omit some costs of nonacquiescence borne by the agencies. Nonac-
quiescence undermines respect for agencies, thereby diminishing voluntary compliance with the law. It
further imposes significant litigation costs on the government. See Note, supra note 8, at 603.
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dent.5° As a result, nonacquiescence creates its own disuniformities by
making a different set of rules available to those who can litigate and
those who cannot. The availability of one set of legal standards for those
who seek review and another set for those who are unable to vindicate
their rights in court undermines the integrity of administrative govern-
ment.51 Such a dual standard of law is particularly offensive because it is
not an incidental by-product of nonacquiescence. Rather, from an agency's
standpoint, many benefits of nonacquiescence are directly related to the
inability of affected parties to challenge its decisions in court.52
The disparate treatment of the rich and the poor engendered by non-
acquiescence is not the only distributional consequence of such a policy.
An additional and potentially devastating consequence of nonacquiescence
is that those parties before the agency that can and do appeal to court
must wait until they have exhausted administrative and judicial proceed-
ings before they can receive the benefit of the circuit's law. The Estreicher
and Revesz analysis misses this crucial time dimension.
The hardship caused by having to wait for judicial rules to be applied
is perhaps clearest in the Social Security context. 3 A recent study by the
General Accounting Office shows that the average length of time between
an initial application for Social Security benefits and completion of pro-
ceedings following remand is close to four years.54 During this time pe-
riod, many disabled persons are forced to subsist on state public assistance
50. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note j-t, at 746.
51. Estreicher and Revesz liken the unfairness of applying different standards to parties based
solely on their ability to engage in litigation to a system of law in which a litigant "can purchase the
rule of law which will govern the disposition of his case and [in which] more favorable rules of law
are progressively more expensive." Id. at 750. As Judge Sand explained in Stieberger v. Heckler:
The consequence of [SSA's] non-acquiescence policy is simply this: one set of rules applies to
those claimants fortunate enough to procure legal representation, persistent enough to appeal
an adverse determination of the various non-acquiescing levels of the agency to a federal court
bound to follow the Court of Appeals ruling, and healthy enough to endure this belabored
process; a different and adverse rule will govern the rights of those claimants who are unrepre-
sented, insufficiently persistent in their efforts to invoke the benefits of favorable federal judi-
cial rulings, or incapable of doing so. The arbitrariness of such a system is evident simply from
its description.
615 F. Supp. 1315, 1362-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.
1986); see Note, Collateral Estoppel and Nonacquiescence: Precluding Government Relitigation in
Pursuit of Litigant Equality, 99 HARV. L. REV. 847, 857-58 (1986).
52. Estreicher and Revesz are more solicitous of the actual costs of relitigation when they discuss
Alan Morrison's proposal for "test case" nonacquiescence. In that context, they recognize that the
costs of compliance for the party appearing before the agency may be less than the costs of litigation.
Estreicher & Revesz, supra note it, at 746-47.
53. See generally Kubitschek, Social Security Administration Nonacquiescence: The Need For
Legislative Curbs on Agency Discretion, 50 U. PIrr. L. REV. 399, 408-12 (1989) (discussing harm to
Social Security recipients and applicants caused by nonacquiescence). Although Estreicher and Revesz
treat the Social Security example as simply one of many contexts for evaluating intracircuit nonacqui-
escence, SSA is one of very few agencies that actually practices intracircuit nonacquiescence. See
supra note 1. Indeed, Estreicher and Revesz devote substantial attention to the SSA experience in
their article and use it as a primary example of intracircuit nonacquiescence.
54. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: SELECTIVE FACE-To-FACE INTERVIEWS
WITH DISABILITY CLAIMANTS COULD REDUCE APPEALS 13 (1989) (Table 1.2).
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programs.55 Others are left with no means of subsistence.5 The benefits
these claimants receive after years of administrative and judicial proceed-
ings can hardly compensate for the loss of the benefits when they were
most needed. While waiting for the application of circuit law to their
cases, claimants may be deprived of basic necessities such as food, 57 shel-
ter,58 and necessary medical care.59 They literally may not survive until
the day when benefits are finally granted.60
Outside the Social Security context, delay creates cognizable costs, al-
though not as dire. For example, Estreicher and Revesz suggest that the
Merit Systems Protection Board engages in some degree of intracircuit
nonacquiescence.' 1 In these cases, significant delays in grade increases and
reinstatement may affect an individual's career path and ability to obtain
55. Even persons with private pension plans can be forced to turn to public assistance because
such plans are often tied to eligibility for Social Security. See, e.g., Music v. Western Conference of
Teachers Pension Trust Fund, 712 F.2d 413, 415-16 (9th Cir. 1983) (eligibility for Teamster pen-
sion plan contingent on receipt of Social Security disability benefits). Therefore, a denial of Social
Security benefits will leave even relatively well-protected workers without any source of income when
they are not able to work due to a disability.
56. In some states, those found not to be disabled are ineligible for any public assistance or Medi-
caid coverage, regardless of their indigency. Many states have extremely limited public assistance
programs for adults. See, e.g., Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 89-90 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing Pennsyl-
vania's general assistance program). Even in states that have a public assistance program for indigent
adults, there is no requirement that Medicaid coverage be provided to adults whose income is slightly
over the public assistance standards and who have not yet been found to meet the disability criteria of
the Social Security Administration. See Fullington v. Shea, 320 F. Supp. 500 (D. Colo. 1970), affd,
404 U.S. 963 (1971).
57. See Hyatt v. Heckler, 579 F. Supp. 985, 989-90 (D.N.C. 1984) (unable to afford adequate
diet), vacated on other grounds, 757 F.2d 1455 (4th Cir. 1985), vacated, 476 U.S. 1167 (1986), affd
in part, 807 F.2d 376 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
58. See, e.g., Holden v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 463, 478 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (forced to sell home to
meet living expenses); Hyatt, 579 F. Supp. at 989 (forced to sell home because of inability to meet
mortgage payments).
59. See Polaski v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 1004, 1013 (D. Minn.) (plaintiffs lose medical insurance
when denied benefits), modified, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984), vacated, 476 U.S. 1167, reinstated,
804 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 927 (1987); Holden, at 476 (unable to pay for
recommended medical tests); Hyatt, 579 F. Supp. at 991 (termination of benefits "has often resulted
in the inability of these persons to secure proper medical treatment for the very conditions from which
they are disabled").
60. See Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1497 (9th Cir.) ("[T]he district court has found that
some class members have already died or suffered further illness as a result of the Secretary's actions.
We agree with that finding."), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984);
Polaski, 585 F. Supp. at 1013 (claimants "die from the very disabilities the agency denies they have");
Hyatt, 579 F. Supp. at 992 ("On several known occasions, former recipients have died ... from the
very conditions which SSA determined were not disabling severe impairments.").
Other claimants suffer a deterioration in their medical conditions. Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F.
Supp. 1315, 1342 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("protracting the adjudicatory process by requiring claimants to
pursue potentially futile procedures is frequently therapeutically detrimental to a claimant's mental
and physical condition"), vacated on other grounds, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986); Thomas v. Heckler,
598 F. Supp. 492, 497 (M.D. Ala. 1984) (many claimants whose benefits are terminated suffer from
"a substantial decline in health"); Polaski, 585 F. Supp. at 1013 (claimants who lose or are denied
benefits "become increasingly anxious, depressed, despairing-all of which aggravates their medical
conditions"); Holden, 584 F. Supp. at 478-79 (termination of benefits was a "significant cause of [the
claimant's] worsened medical condition"); Hyatt, 579 F. Supp. at 992 (emotional stress from financial
pressures "tends only to aggravate the severity of ... physical or emotional disabilities").
61. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note -f-, at 718.
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a full remedy. Although these hardships are less dramatic, they remain a
cost to be factored into any cost-benefit analysis of nonacquiescence.
The final factor Estreicher and Revesz consider is the impact that non-
acquiescence has on the workload of the Federal courts. Although they
recognize that it is "logical to expect""2 that the workload will increase
with nonacquiescence, they do not discuss the magnitude of the burden
their proposal places on the courts. If all disappointed parties before the
agencies pursued their rights, the courts would be crushed by the burden
of adjudicating repetitive identical cases.03 In the Social Security context,
for example, the rate of judicial filings soared following the agency's
adoption of a policy of nonacquiescence, leading to a significant impact on
the judicial docket.64 Because it would bar judicial injunctions to require
agencies to comply with circuit law, Estreicher and Revesz' proposal
would have an even greater impact on the judicial workload.65 This judi-
cial burden would only be mitigated to the extent that claimants were
unaware of their likelihood of success on appeal.
A fair consideration of the costs and supposed benefits of nonacquies-
cence requires rejection of Estreicher and Revesz' proposed standard.
Each benefit they identify is based on a view of the judicial system that
does not square with the rules applied by the circuit courts. In contrast to
the illusory benefits of nonacquiescence, its costs are undeniable. 6
62. Id. at 750.
63. Each case requires careful judicial review, even though the reversible error caused by nonac-
quiescence may appear to be easy to identify. Judicial review of administrative decisions generally
calls on the court to reverse, affirm, modify, or remand. Because remand is a remedy that imposes
additional delay on the party affected by nonacquiescence, a court may well feel an obligation to
review the record to determine whether the administrative decision should be reversed. See, e.g., Car-
roll v. Secretary of HHS, 705 F.2d 638, 644 (2d Cir. 1983) ("A remand, potentially followed by
another appeal, could well delay the payment of benefits to which Carroll appears to be entitled for
still further years."). Such review is more burdensome and time consuming than reviewing a record
where the proper legal standards have been applied and the court need only assess whether there is
substantial evidence or an abuse of discretion. Furthermore, if circuit courts are to give consideration
to abandoning past precedent, these cases could absorb the time of the entire circuit.
64. In fiscal year 1980, district courts issued dispositions in 8,179 appeals from denials of benefits.
See OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS, SSA, OPERATIONAL REPORT 35-36 (Sept. 1985) (4,859
affirmations, reversals, and dismissals, and 3,320 remands). By fiscal year 1985, the number of dispo-
sitions had increased to 27,858 with more than 50,000 cases pending. OFFICE OF POLICY AND PROCE-
DURES, SSA, COURT REMANDS: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (Dec. 1987).
65. Injunctions against SSA have obviated judicial review of thousands of individual decisions.
See, e.g., Hyatt v. Heckler, 711 F. Supp. 837, 843-48 (W.D.N.C. 1989); Thomas v. Heckler, 598 F.
Supp. 492 (M.D. Ala. 1984); Mental Health Ass'n of Minn. v. Schweiker, 554 F. Supp. 157 (D.
Minn. 1982), affd, 720 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1983).
66. Even if one accords weight to the benefits Estreicher and Revesz ascribe to nonacquiescence,
the cost-benefit calculus should be tailored to the nature of the interest adjudicated by the agency.
Where the agency administers a public benefits program, delay in the application of circuit law will
have the most extreme costs, and the agency is most likely to be influenced by the cold calculus that
affected parties will lack the resources to appeal. As discussed below, see infra p. 826, these considera-
tions are directly relevant to due process balancing. Estreicher and Revesz provide little explanation
for why they would permit intracircuit nonacquiescence in these circumstances, where the entire pur-
pose of a congressional program-to provide monthly income or medical treatment-is frustrated by
requiring parties to wait years to obtain their benefits.
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III. NONACQUIESCENCE AND CHEVRON DEFERENCE
In light of the disruption and unfairness caused by nonacquiescence, it is
difficult to believe that Congress would choose to impose such disarray on
the legal system. Estreicher and Revesz argue, however, that such express
congressional authorization is irrelevant to the legality of nonacquiescence
because a tolerance for nonacquiescence is implicit in "our administrative
lawmaking system . . . ,,. In particular, they argue that administrative
agencies have statutory responsibilities to administer the law in a uniform
manner. Thus, they suggest that in the absence of a specific congressional
statement on the subject of nonacquiescence, a direction to apply the law
uniformly should be treated as an interstice in a statute that agencies can
interpret to include the authority to nonacquiesce. Once an agency reads
such authority into the statute, Estreicher and Revesz would defer to the
agency's reading, so long as nonacquiescence is constrained by their stan-
dards of reasonableness.
The principal authority Estreicher and Revesz rely on for this broad
delegation to agencies is Chevron v. NRDC.6" They argue that Chevron
recognizes that agencies play a special role in interpreting statutes and
that an agency interpretation can only be struck down where it is incon-
sistent with clear congressional intent. 9 The respect for agency interpre-
tations of statutes set forth in Chevron, however, does not address the
question posed by nonacquiescence-namely the agency's authority to
limit the effect of judicial decisions finding that the agency acted in viola-
tion of congressional intent.
Statutory obligations to apply the law uniformly cannot fairly be read
as granting agencies the authority to choose whether to nonacquiesce. As
explained above, nonacquiescence does not further uniformity in our
existing system of judicial review. Although an illusion of uniformity may
be created where affected parties do not seek judicial review, nonacquies-
cence in fact promotes disuniformity between those who appeal and those
who do not. Any contribution to long-run uniformity, through circuits
abandoning their precedents, is highly speculative.
More generally, nonacquiescence does not fit comfortably into the rea-
sons for delegating the interpretation of statutory silence to agencies. The
deference owed to agency interpretations of broad grants of authority is
premised on the agency having special expertise and competence to decide
the matter at issue. Where there is a broad grant of authority to make
rules, it does not matter that Congress has not authorized a particular
rule. The agency is trusted to exercise its expertise fairly to achieve over-
all congressional objectives.
67. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note -f', at 729.
68. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
69. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note it, at 724, 729.
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There is no broad grant of authority to agencies, however, to determine
the scope of judicial review to supervise agency conduct. Judicial review of
agency action, after all, is the principal means by which Congress can
hope to hold agencies accountable to statutory limitations on agency
power.7 0 Thus, agencies do not enjoy the authority to determine when the
courts have jurisdiction over agency action, 1 whether the courts can issue
class-wide injunctions, 2 or other matters that bear on the scope of judicial
review. Agencies are not entitled to deference on these issues because these
matters do not fall within the agency's area of expertise, but rather con-
cern the authority and effectiveness of the branch in charge of supervising
and controlling agency excesses.7
The very factors identified by Estreicher and Revesz as relevant to the
justifiability of nonacquiescence illustrate why the authoritative force of
judicial decisions does not fit within the scope of matters properly dele-
gated to an agency. For example, the burden of requiring the judicial
branch to revisit issues that are settled within the circuit is not a matter
that falls within the agency's special expertise. Similarly, the agency's po-
sition as a litigant is likely to influence its perspective on the burden that
noncompliance with the law of the circuit imposes on affected parties.7 4 In
addition to lacking expertise as to the concerns raised by nonacquiescence,
an agency may have many interests implicated by nonacquiescence that
have little to do with the factors identified as justifying nonacquiescence.
For example, the agency may face budget pressures that would be eased
by nonacquiescence. The agency may disagree with the policies mandated
by statute and may wish to have the power to enforce its own view of the
law. The agency may wish to stave off lawsuits for prospective injunctive
70. Indeed, some recent congressional initiatives have been directed towards expanding, rather
than contracting, congressional control over agencies. See Sunstein, Participation, Public Law, and
Venue Reform, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 976, 976-77 (1982). Some of these efforts at control have been
held to be invalid. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 966 (1983) (invalidating legislative veto). Judi-
cial review remains one of the few ways that Congress can ensure that agencies do not exceed in-
tended limitations.
71. The jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction is firmly placed with the judiciary. See generally
Sager, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Au-
thority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17, 26 (1981).
72. For example, the Supreme Court's decision that district courts can entertain class actions
against SSA was not informed by the agency's claim that the statute should be read to require individ-
ual suits. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
73. In their Reply, Estreicher and Revesz note that deference to agencies is also based on the
agency's appropriate institutional role as a policy-maker. Estreicher & Revesz, Reply, supra note 18,
at 841. Grants of policymaking authority are subject to the constraints of judicial review. The balance
between the judiciary's role in effectuating congressional intent and the agency's policy-making discre-
tion is properly addressed in substantive standards for review of agency action, such as the standard
set forth in Chevron. Nonacquiescence upsets this balance by allowing agencies to pursue their poli-
cies irrespective of judicial findings of invalidity made pursuant to these substantive standards.
74. For example, if SSA had been asked to weigh hardships before nonacquiescing in circuit
standards for terminating benefits, it no doubt would have underestimated the hardships caused by its
position. In the agency's view, these claimants had been properly terminated from benefits and were
no longer disabled. See infra pp. 826-28 (discussing nonacquiescence in standard for terminating
benefits).
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relief by relying on the added argument that the court is without power to
issue injunctive relief because of a nonacquiescence ruling on the issue."
The authority to nonacquiesce may also assist the agency in controlling
the facts of cases that ultimately reach the Supreme Court by allowing the
government to shop around for the most favorable set of facts for Supreme
Court review. 6
Most troubling is the fact that illegitimate considerations are likely to
affect decisions to nonacquiesce. For example, agencies are most likely to
nonacquiesce when they will not be burdened by high costs of litigation
and readjudication at the agency level. Thus, they are most likely to read
their statutes as permitting nonacquiescence when they can count on
affected parties lacking the resources or the sophistication to appeal, or
when the amount at stake for the affected party does not warrant the costs
of seeking judicial review. The high likelihood that these factors will in-
fluence agencies makes nonacquiescence totally unsuited to treatment as a
matter that falls within broad grants of delegated authority.
Estreicher and Revesz argue that such motives for nonacquiescence
should not be imputed to agencies because agencies are entitled to a "pre-
sumption of regularity. '77 In particular, they argue that there is no basis
for assuming that a benefits agency charged with administering a program
would seek to limit payments under the program. This argument is un-
doubtedly correct as a matter of administrative law when the agency is
exercising its delegated authority. But the agency has no delegated author-
ity to determine the scope of judicial power. Furthermore, the presump-
tion of regularity loses its force when a court of appeals has concluded
that the agency has acted outside the bounds of its discretion. Once the
court has found that the agency has acted outside its authority, there is
good reason to be concerned that the agency is not acting to effectuate the
will of Congress but is instead swayed by extra-statutory concerns.
Viewing nonacquiescence as a delegated matter of statutory interpreta-
tion ignores the role that the courts play in effectuating congressional in-
75. Under Estreicher and Revesz' model, the power of nonacquiescence decisions to defeat litiga-
tion seeking injunctive relief would assure that many such decisions would be made during the course
of litigation. It is common for agencies facing injunctive relief to attempt to avoid such relief. See, e.g.,
Hyatt v. Heckler, 711 F. Supp. 837, 840-41 (W.D.N.C. 1989); Dixon v. Bowen, 673 F. Supp. 123,
125-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1367-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), va-
cated on other grounds, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986). Under current law, courts do not accord any
presumption of regularity to attempts to defeat actions for injunctions "by protestations of repentance
and reform." United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 n.5 (1953) (quoting United States
v. Oregon Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952)). Instead, such efforts are closely scrutinized and
viewed with suspicion. See id.; Ahrens v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 49, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1988).
76. The Solicitor General already has an advantage over other litigants in determining what cases
are taken by the Court. See S. ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, supra note 25, at 100. Although Estreicher
and Revesz do not treat the Solicitor General's failure to seek certiorari due to the facts of a case as
fitting within their concept of reasonable efforts to obtain review, there is little way to police a stan-
dard that does not squarely require that certiorari be sought.
77. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note "ft, at 757 n.346.
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tent. Indeed, Chevron, the primary authority Estreicher and Revesz cite
for the proposition that nonacquiescence falls within the scope of dele-
gated discretion, reaffirms that the judiciary is the ultimate arbiter of the
meaning of statutes. 8 Although Chevron requires that the courts defer to
an administrative agency's construction of its governing statute, it leaves
the courts with the final word whether the agency has complied with its
statutory mandate.
Estreicher and Revesz essentially allow the agencies to double dip on
their Chevron rights to deference. They provide that even after a court
has granted an agency the deference owed under Chevron, it must further
stay its hand in enjoining what the court has found to be an unwarranted
exercise of agency power. Rather than counseling in favor of nonacquies-
cence, the deferential standard of review in Chevron argues for increased
enforcement of judicial declarations that agencies have acted outside the
bounds of their authority.
79
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NONACQUIESCENCE UNDER THE
EXISTING STRUCTURE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION
Estreicher and Revesz analyze the constitutionality of nonacquiescence
by postulating the existence of a statute explicitly authorizing such con-
duct by Federal agencies. They conclude that this hypothetical statute
would pass constitutional muster. Regardless of whether one accepts the
legality of such a statute, this analysis sheds little light on the constitution-
ality of nonacquiescence in the absence of such express congressional
authorization. As explained above, because nonacquiescence implicates the
78. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 & n.9; see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447 (1987);
Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., 322 U.S. 607, 616 (1944) ("determination of the extent of author-
ity given to a delegated agency by Congress is not left for the decision of him in whom authority is
vested").
79. See Strauss, supra note 29, at 1122 ("While nonacquiescence may have some intuitive force
for an agency faced with a court decision that it is wrong under a precise decision model, it seems far
less acceptable if a court has found an agency's interpretation to be beyond the zone of
reasonableness.").
In their Reply, Estreicher and Revesz claim that we adopt an implicit view of agencies as identical
to district courts. Estreicher & Revesz, Reply, supra note 18, at 839-41. We recognize, however, that
judicial review of agency action differs from appellate review of lower courts. For example, the defer-
ential standard set forth in Chevron circumscribes judicial review of agency interpretation of statutes.
In contrast, appellate courts exercise de novo review of district court decisions on statutory interpreta-
tion. Similarly, the appellate courts have far more power to structure proceedings in the district courts
than before agencies. Compare Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 146-47 (1985) (circuit courts have
supervisory authority to require parties to file objections to magistrates' reports) and New York State
Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1147 (2d Cir. 1983) (setting prudential
rules for attorney fee records) with Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519,
524 (1978) (courts cannot impose procedural requirements on agencies for rulemaking not mandated
by statute) and FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940) (on remand, agency must
correct legal error identified by court, but may exercise its delegated discretion as to other matters).
However, once a court of appeals, applying principles of judicial review of agency action, finds an
agency to have exceeded the bounds of its delegated authority, the court's responsibility to effectuate
the will of Congress becomes preeminent.
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scope and efficacy of judicial review, it cannot be assumed that Congress
has delegated the matter to agencies through general grants of rule-
making or other quasi-legislative authority. Accordingly, the fact that
Congress may be able to fashion a scheme of judicial review that permits
nonacquiescence does not further the analysis of whether agencies can
nonacquiesce given the existing structure of judicial review.
Without the benefit of express congressional guidance on the issue, as-
sessment of the constitutionality of nonacquiescence calls for closer exami-
nation of the role of Article III courts in resolving disputes and declaring
the law. Estreicher and Revesz accept the premise that the highest Article
III court, the Supreme Court, issues declarations of law binding on the
executive department through precedential effect. Marbury v. Madison8"
settled the proposition that the judiciary can issue statements of law that
bind officials of the other branches. In Cooper v. Aaron,81 the Court held
that its declarations of law are binding on governmental officials sworn to
uphold the law, even though they may not have been formal parties to the
case and were not bound by the terms of a court order.82 Read together,
Marbury and Cooper articulate a system of judicial review under which
the judiciary does not simply issue narrowly framed orders which bind the
parties to a case, but also announces declarations of law binding on the
executive branch through precedential effect.
Under the Constitution, the power to issue binding declarations of law
is an attribute of the judicial branch in general, not simply of the Supreme
Court. Accordingly, the seminal Supreme Court decisions pertaining to
separation of powers are framed as discussions of the authority of the
judicial department as a whole.83 The issue, therefore, is where this power
is situated within that branch.
This question can only be answered by looking to the structure of the
judiciary and the system of judicial review created by Congress and the
courts. The rules of appellate procedure and contours of stare decisis dis-
cussed in Part I reveal that the system delegates the power to create bind-
80. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
81. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
82. By its terms, Cooper dealt with the obligation of state and local officials to adhere to pro-
nouncements of the judiciary. While some have argued that Cooper is inapplicable to Federal officials
because the executive branch is a "co-equal" of the judiciary, see Meese, The Law of the Constitution,
61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 986-88 (1987), we agree with Estreicher and Revesz that such a distinction is
unsupportable. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974), the Court rejected the notion
that the executive branch is a "co-equal" to the judiciary in matters of interpretation of law. See also
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447 (1987) ("[tlhe judiciary is the final authority on issues of
statutory construction") (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837-43 n.9 (1984)). In-
deed, Cooper is far more sweeping in its assertion of the obligation to follow declarations of law since
it applies to non-parties to the proceeding that created the precedent. See supra note 28.
83. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 704 (judicial power of the United States vested in the
Federal courts by Article III § 1); Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18 ("[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution"); Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177 ("It is, emphatically, the province
of the judicial department, to say what the law is.").
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ing precedent within each region to the courts of appeals."4 In this way
Congress and the courts have sacrificed precise uniformity across regions
in favor of a system that produces a unitary rule of law in each region in
a timely manner. Absent such a system, there would be little left of the
Article III function of issuing binding declarations of law. Such declara-
tions could be issued solely by the Supreme Court, or following years of
litigation in the circuit courts, and would therefore be unavailable as a
practical matter. In effect, the judiciary would be stymied by its sheer size
and would be unable to generate rules of conduct for long periods of time.
Although the judicial system does not make declarations of law issued by
courts of appeals immutable and has mechanisms for resolving regional
conflicts, the rules constraining reconsideration of precedent make the dec-
larations of law by circuit courts binding statements within their jurisdic-
tions unless and until they are overturned.
In contrast, Estreicher and Revesz' proposal renders the decision of a
circuit court little more than a vote to be counted in a later determination
of what the law should be. While their proposal would minimize the pos-
sibility that agencies would act in reliance on declarations that are subject
to change, it would greatly reduce the power of the judicial branch to
issue binding statements of law. It would also create an anomalous situa-
tion where the accepted rules of agency conduct would conflict with the
rules available to parties in court. The judiciary's role as resolver of indi-
vidual disputes would be severed from its function as declarer of the law,
thereby undermining the system of voluntary compliance that society re-
lies on to resolve most disputes without resort to the judiciary."5 Above all,
the system they propose is not the model that Congress and the courts
have adopted. 6
Estreicher and Revesz argue that their model leaves the formal author-
ity of the courts of appeals unimpaired."7 But in fact, their proposal
greatly limits the powers of these courts. Most importantly, their model
makes it impossible for any court to issue injunctive relief until a consen-
sus has emerged in the circuits, or the Supreme Court has spoken on an
issue. In fact, Estreicher and Revesz recognize that the power of the lower
courts to enjoin agency action is at odds with their proposal that agencies
remain free to engage in nonacquiescence until the judicial system as a
84. See supra pp. 803-11.
85. See Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 TUL. L. REv. 991,
994-95 (1987).
86. In a recent article, Professor Joshua Schwartz raises new questions about the compatibility of
intracircuit nonacquiescence and Article II. See Schwartz, supra note 28. Professor Schwartz argues
that agencies engaged in adjudication are exercising Article III power, and are therefore bound by the
precedential rules of Article III courts. Professor Schwartz' analysis is rooted in a constitutional right
to judicial review of agency fact finding. Our analysis applies wherever Congress has granted a right
to judicial review.
87. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note ---, at 731.
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whole has reached a final resolution of a matter."8 But they fail
to recognize that these existing remedial powers are a further indication
that nonacquiescence conflicts with the powers Congress has vested in the
lower Federal courts.
The degree to which Estreicher and Revesz' proposal conflicts with the
current availability of judicial relief reveals the radical nature of nonac-
quiescence. Their prohibition on prospective injunctions until the judici-
ary as a whole has resolved an issue would dramatically undermine the
potency of judicial review and thereby diminish the ability of the courts to
require agency adherence to congressional standards.
A different question would be presented were Congress to choose to
restructure the powers of the lower courts through limitations on injunc-
tive powers, revision of the rules regarding precedent, or a specific author-
ization of nonacquiescence. Similarly, limitations on judicial review for
specific programs may indicate a congressional preference for a less vigor-
ous role for the lower courts than that suggested by the general structure
of the lower courts. For example, Congress has expressly withheld tradi-
tional injunctive powers from the judiciary in cases challenging the collec-
tion of taxes."9 But absent a strong congressional limitation on traditional
judicial powers, the existing structure of judicial review requires that the
decisions of the circuit courts be treated as authoritative.90 Before conclud-
88. The power of lower Federal courts to enjoin agency conduct is firmly established in the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. Far from requiring definitive resolution of an issue by the entire judi-
cial branch, Rule 23 allows a district court to certify a plaintiff class and enter a class-wide prelimi-
nary injunction against an agency under Rule 65, based solely upon its own weighing of the equities
and a finding that a class of plaintiffs has shown a "likelihood of success on the merits" or has
presented "sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litiga-
tion." Ellender v. Schweiker, 550 F. Supp. 1348, 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (quoting Jackson Dairy, Inc.
v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam)); see Leschniok v. Heckler,
713 F.2d 520, 524 (9th Cir. 1983); Lyon v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248 257-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Upon losing in district court, an agency can appeal but is not entitled to an automatic stay of the
lower court's order. Instead, Federal agencies must satisfy the same discretionary standards for stays
pending appeal as other litigants. See FED. R. Civ. P. 62(c); FED. R. APP. P. 8. See, e.g., Mental
Health Ass'n of Minn. v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 965, 967 n.5 (8th Cir. 1983). These rules enable the
judicial branch to respond quickly to challenges to agency action.
89. 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (1983).
90. In some instances, statutory schemes may provide for particularly potent judicial review which
renders nonacquiescence especially offensive to principles of the separation of powers. For example,
determinations of SSA are subject to a system of judicial review that "suggest[s] a degree of direct
interaction between a federal court and an administrative agency alien to traditional review of agency
action under the Administrative Procedure Act." Sullivan v. Hudson, 109 S. Ct. 2248, 2254 (1989).
In their Reply, Estreicher and Revesz suggest that Congress has approved of nonacquiescence by
failing to outlaw it in the Social Security Disability Reform Act of 1984. Estreicher & Revesz, Reply,
supra note 18, at 844. This reading of the legislative history is unwarranted, since the Conference
Committee expressly stated that its failure to reach agreement on a specific provision banning nonac-
quiescence should not be construed as an endorsement of nonacquiescence. H.R. CONF. REP. No.
1039, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3095; see
Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1361-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 801
F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
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ing that Congress has decided to curtail the judicial functions of Article
III courts, a clear statement of such an intent should be required."
Entirely apart from separation of powers objections, nonacquiescence
poses serious equal protection and due process concerns. Estreicher and
Revesz correctly recognize that due process and equal protection analyses
of nonacquiescence depend on the particular administrative program in-
volved.92 They nonetheless conclude that it is always permissible for an
agency to nonacquiesce for a period of time. 3 This per se rule does not
accord with constitutional standards that are sensitive to indigency and
hardship.
Estreicher and Revesz argue that disparities between those parties who
cannot appeal to court and those who can is analogous to the imposition of
fees as a prerequisite to filing a lawsuit. Stated in its strongest form, the
analogy suggests that many disparities in society render some parties bet-
ter able to pursue litigation than others and that the judicial system need
not be structured to equalize all of these distinctions. As Estreicher and
Revesz explain, the Supreme Court has upheld statutory provisions that
limit access to the courts, including the imposition of a reasonable filing
fee on bankruptcy petitions,94 and fees to commence litigation challenging
administrative proceedings.
9 5
The reasoning of these cases limiting the principle of litigant equality
does not extend to situations where the government itself is applying dif-
ferent legal rules based on an individual's ability to pursue judicial reme-
dies.9 6 When an agency nonacquiesces, cases are decided under two sets of
standards. One set applies to those who do not appeal. Another applies to
those who appeal and have their cases remanded for application of bind-
ing circuit law. The choice of standards depends entirely on the affected
party's ability to navigate the system of administrative and judicial ap-
peals. Rather than endorsing the use of such disparate standards, the rea-
soning of the Court's opinion in Ortwein v. Schwab, which upholds filing
fees to challenge administrative proceedings, casts serious doubt on the
permissibility of basing agency adjudicatory standards on the ability to
pay a fee. In Ortwein, the Court noted that there was no reason to doubt
91. In Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979), the Court declined to infer a limitation on the
power of the judiciary to issue injunctive relief or to certify plaintiff classes absent a clear statement of
such an intent from Congress. A clear statement rule is plainly appropriate with respect to nonac-
quienscene in light of the effect of nonacquiescence on the power of the judicial branch. As explained
above, administrative agencies are particularly unsuited to evaluate the issues raised by nonacquies-
cence. See generally Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (clear statement from Con-
gress required where issues at stake went beyond those properly of concern to agency).
92. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note ft, at 732-35.
93. According to Estreicher and Revesz, fairness concerns should only affect the degree to which
consensus of other circuit courts is necessary before nonacquiescence must be halted. Id. at 757.
94. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
95. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam).
96. In general, these cases stand for the proposition that a judicial system may impose reasonable
fees to pay for its administration. Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 660; Kras, 409 U.S. at 447-49.
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that the administrative proceedings had been conducted fairly.9 Thus it
granted the agency a presumption of regularity that rendered judicial re-
view less important. Far from assuring that the administrative process acts
with regularity, nonacquiescence means that the administrative process
virtually guarantees reversible error.98
For agencies that conduct adjudicatory proceedings, deliberate reliance
on legal standards rejected by reviewing courts raises serious due process
questions. Rather than providing a means for fairly determining the rights
and obligations of parties, the administrative process becomes a series of
obstacles yielding decisions that are predictably subject to reversal by re-
viewing courts.99 It is hard to see how these burdensome procedures im-
posed by nonacquiescence can be justified by the tenuous governmental
interests involved.' 00 Even if all parties appealed, the result would be to
delay the application of judicial standards. This delay in itself can raise
serious due process concerns.''
Application of Estreicher and Revesz' proposed test to the most notori-
ous example of nonacquiescence in the 1980's, SSA's rejection of the
"medical improvement" standard, illustrates how it would legitimate non-
acquiescence that violates the constitutional rights of parties appearing
before agencies as well as principles of separation of powers. 0 2 Litigation
concerning this issue also illustrates the central role that injunctive relief
plays in curbing agency excesses.
SSA's formal ruling of nonacquiescence in Patti v. Schweiker'03 appears
to satisfy the proposed "reasonableness" test. In Patti, the Ninth Circuit
97. 410 U.S. at 659 n.4. The Court noted that administrative hearings "provide a procedure, not
conditioned on payment of any fee, through which appellants have been able to seek redress." Id. at
660.
98. A number of courts have expressed doubts about the validity of such a system under due
process and equal protection principles. See Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1440 (9th Cir. 1983),
adhered to, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984); Jones v.
Califano, 576 F.2d 12, 20 (2d Cir. 1978); Stieberger, 615 F. Supp. at 1363.
99. Estreicher and Revesz argue that due process objections to nonacquiescence merely restate
separation of powers arguments. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note "it, at 731-32. The issues, however,
are distinct. Separation of powers analysis asks whether the structure of government requires the
agency to apply the declarations of law of the circuit courts. Due process analysis inquires into the
procedures followed to adjudicate cases and balances the relevant governmental and individual inter-
ests at stake. Under due process analysis, the likelihood that a set of procedures will alter the outcome
of a case is highly relevant. Thus, the mere possibility that a circuit court would reverse settled
precedent would rarely justify the cumbersome administrative and judicial procedures that nonacqui-
escence imposes on parties before the agency.
100. See supra pp. 812-17.
101. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985); Barry v. Barchi, 443
U.S. 55, 66 (1979); Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975).
102. A full discussion of this instance of nonacquiescence is found in S. MEZEY, No LONGER
DISABLED: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY (1988).
Although nonacquiescence in the medical improvement standard has received the most attention, SSA
has failed to conform its administrative practices to comply with many circuit court decisions without
formally announcing its nonacquiescence. See generally Kubitschek, supra note 53, at 443-49 (dis-
cussing SSA's nonacquiescence practices).
103. 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982).
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held that the agency could not terminate payment of disability benefits on
the ground that a recipient is no longer disabled, without first concluding
that the individual's medical condition had improved since the last time
the recipient had been found eligible. After the court's decision in Patti,
the agency vigorously pursued the issue in other circuits. Although all
circuits that considered the issue eventually ruled against the agency,"0" it
could not be said at the outset that SSA's litigation position was frivolous
in circuits that had not yet ruled on the matter1 0 5 Under Estreicher and
Revesz' standard, nonacquiescence in Patti appears to have been
"reasonable."
The consequences of the agency's refusal to follow Patti and similar
cases in other circuits were catastrophic for hundreds of thousands of dis-
abled persons.' 8 As discussed above, the hardships they were forced to
endure included deprivations of basic necessities and essential medical
care. 107 When recipients appealed these determinations to court, they pre-
vailed in the overwhelming majority of cases.108 Because of the disparity
between administrative and judicial rules, the number of cases challenging
the agency's denials of benefits filed in district courts increased dramati-
cally. Between 1980 and 1985 the number of court dispositions of such
cases trebled.' 9 Even so, thousands of disabled persons were unable to
appeal to court.
Recipients who lost benefits filed class actions to halt SSA's nonacquies-
cence in the cases requiring application of a medical improvement stan-
dard. 1 These class actions provided prospective relief that spared
104. Byron v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir. 1984); Buckley v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1047 (5th
Cir. 1984); Rush v. Secretary of HHS, 738 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1984); DeLeon v. Secretary of HHS,
734 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1984); Haynes v. Secretary of HHS, 734 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1984); Dotson v.
Schweiker, 719 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1983); Kuzmin v. Schweiker, 714 F.2d 1233 (3d Cir. 1983); Simp-
son v. Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966 (11 th Cir. 1982). In addition, a number of circuits had rejected SSA's
argument prior to Patti. See Cassiday v. Schweiker, 663 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1981); Miranda v. Secre-
tary of HEW, 514 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1975). The Secretary did not seek certiorari immediately, and
Estreicher and Revesz' proposal may not have required it to have done so. Estreicher & Revesz, supra
note j-, at 756 ("it might be reasonable for the agency not to seek [Supreme Court review in advance
of an intercircuit conflict").
105. For example, the Second Circuit hesitated to adopt the medical improvement standard. See
Delamater v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Wheeler v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 595 (2d
Cir. 1983) (declining to adopt medical improvement standard for Supplemental Security Income re-
cipients grandfathered into program); Smith v. Schweiker, 709 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming on
jurisdictional grounds dismissal of class action on merits challenging agency's failure to apply medical
improvement standard).
106. Nationally, SSA terminated the benefits of approximately 500,000 recipients between March
1981 and April 1984. DeLeon v. Secretary of HHS, 734 F.2d 930, 931 n.1 (2d Cir. 1984).
107. See supra pp. 814-16.
108. In fact, by 1984, when many of these cases reached the judiciary, over 80% of the denials or
terminations of benefits reviewed by courts were overturned. OFFICE OF POLICY AND PROCEDURES,
supra note 64, at 4.
109. The number of court dispositions concerning the denial or termination of benefits rose from
8,179 to 27,858 during the course of five years. See supra note 64.
110. See, e.g., Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1983), adhered to, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th
Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984); Polaski v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 1004,
1011-13 (D. Minn. 1984), remanded on other grounds, 751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984); Holden v.
The Yale Law Journal
thousands of persons the hardship of losing their subsistence income pur-
suant to standards found invalid by their circuits' court of appeals."'
Most of these individuals would not have appealed and would not have
received relief through individual actions. Under the Estreicher and
Revesz proposal, the courts that certified these plaintiff classes and
granted this relief acted wrongly. Instead, the proposal would have re-
quired these courts to forebear from granting relief until a consensus of
the circuits solidified or the Supreme Court granted review." 2
The confrontation between the judiciary and SSA created by the
agency's nonacquiescence was ultimately resolved by congressional rejec-
tion of the agency's standard.1 1 3 Even despite eventual class action orders
and congressional action, agency nonacquiescence seriously harmed tens of
thousands of disabled persons. These recipients suffered years of interrup-
tion or permanent deprivation of benefits intended to provide a basic
monthly income. This predictable and serious harm was inflicted for no
discernible legitimate interest.
The medical improvement issue is unusual in that it affected hundreds
of thousands of people in a short period of time. This sudden and massive
effect brought about widespread publicity and relatively rapid resolution
of the issue in the courts and by Congress. But even in this context, non-
acquiescence allowed the agency to wreak havoc on the lives of those who
relied on it to execute the law faithfully. In other contexts, where nonac-
quiescence continues through years of "percolation," the absence of
Supreme Court or congressional intervention would allow equally serious
harms to continue unabated.
V. CONCLUSION
Our system of judicial review of agency action depends upon oversight
by the lower Federal courts. Through court of appeals' precedents and
district court injunctions, the judiciary can respond quickly to challenges
to agency action. Thus, a court of appeals decision creates binding prece-
dent at the time it is issued and not simply at some later point when it is
adopted by the other circuits or affirmed by the Supreme Court. Similarly,
district court judges can issue injunctions based on their view of the law
Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 463 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
111. For example, class-wide preliminary injunctive relief was provided in Lopez v. Heckler, 713
F.2d at 1432. While the Supreme Court stayed the retroactive portion of the injunction pending
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the prospective relief granted by the district court remained in effect
throughout the appellate proceedings. Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U.S. 1328 (Rehnquist, J., Circuit Jus-
tice) (granting partial stay), affd by full Court, 464 U.S. 879 (1983).
112. Adoption of Estreicher and Revesz' proposal might have allowed courts to issue injunctions
at some point prior to consideration by all of the circuits. It would have insulated the agency from
injunctive relief, however, until a number of circuits had considered the issue. Estreicher & Revesz,
supra note "t', at 757.
113. Disability Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1805 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
423(f) (Supp. V 1987)).
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without waiting to poll the judiciary as a whole on an issue. This delega-
tion of authority to the lower federal courts gives rise to a system in which
court decisions that affect private individuals and administrative agencies
are sometimes later rejected, either on direct appeal or through appeal of
similar cases. But reliance on court decisions that may one day be over-
turned is inherent in a legal system designed to protect rights in a timely
manner.
Estreicher and Revesz' proposal is particularly unfair because it would
make standards enunciated by the lower Federal courts available to some
parties, but not others. Under their proposal, an agency decision to non-
acquiesce would prohibit the lower courts from requiring agencies to ap-
ply judicial standards in making initial decisions. Even the device of the
class-wide injunction, designed to accord the benefits of judicial rules to
those who would not otherwise have access to courts, would be unavaila-
ble. At the same time, the proposal would leave the lower courts free to
order the agency to apply judicial standards to individual parties who file
cases in court.
While we do not believe that effective judicial review should be ren-
dered more remote in any respect, it is the partial nature of Estreicher
and Revesz' proposal that renders it a pernicious system of judicial re-
view. The elimination of disparities between the needy and the well-off
may be a distant goal, but a system of judicial review that is founded on
the ability of parties to purchase the rule of law is surely a step
backwards.
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